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This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).In May 2014 we organised a workshop entitled ‘‘Costs and Beneﬁts of Imperfect Cognitions’’, hosted by the University of
Birmingham and funded by an AHRC Fellowship on the epistemic innocence of imperfect cognitions. Most of the talks pre-
sented during the workshop are now part of this special issue. Two additional papers are also included.
The purpose of the workshop and this collection of papers is to reﬂect on the effects of ‘‘imperfect cognitions’’ on agents’
wellbeing, success, health, and capacity for knowledge. We consider some paradigmatic examples of irrational beliefs, such
as beliefs formed as a result of reasoning mistakes; delusions in schizophrenia, delusional disorders, and anosognosia;
memories that are either distorted or entirely fabricated; and beliefs and preferences affected by implicit bias.
Our ﬁrst objective is to discuss the different types of costs and beneﬁts that such cognitions might have, and debunk some
myths. Here are some of the questions the contributors ask: Can delusions have some epistemic beneﬁts? Are ecologically
rational choices always adaptive? Why are delusions regarded as pathological whereas other irrational beliefs are not? Are
there any positive ways for distorted or false memories to impact on wellbeing or knowledge? Is it true that we are not
responsible for actions driven by implicit attitudes?
Our second objective is to explore the relationship among different types of costs and beneﬁts. The following issues are
part of this exploration: Do evolutionary advantages and epistemic ones go hand-in-hand? Does the harmfulness of delu-
sions always translate into impoverished epistemic access to the world? What are the effects of an out-of-date conception
of the self for wellbeing and socialisation? Can confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias be good for the
agents who provide them? Can a false memory fail to represent reality but succeed in conveying personal meanings?
A very common way of understanding the role of imperfect cognitions is to present them as epistemically bad but other-
wise pragmatically useful. Self-deception is the obvious case: if we avoid the belief that we are responsible for some nega-
tively valued event, we end up feeling better about ourselves, but we forego an understanding of the process that led to the
event. The thought then is that pragmatic beneﬁts are had at the expense of epistemic ones. Our research into imperfect
cognitions has just started, but the contributions to this volume suggest that we should resist the trade-off view of the
relationship between pragmatic and epistemic beneﬁts, and adopt a more liberal view of what constitutes an epistemic
beneﬁt.
1. What are the beneﬁts of epistemically ﬂawed beliefs?
Lisa Bortolotti is interested in the potential beneﬁts of irrational beliefs, and she focuses on pathological beliefs. In
particular, she discusses those delusions that have been construed as playing a defensive function, such as Reverse
Othello syndrome, erotomania, and anosognosia. Such delusions are wildly implausible, but at the time at which they are
endorsed, they may carry both psychological and epistemic beneﬁts. They act as a defence protecting agents from low
self-esteem and the potentially disruptive consequences of overwhelming negative emotions. In virtue of such beneﬁts, they
also allow agents to avoid depression and continue interacting with the surrounding physical and social environment in a
way that may be conducive to feedback from social exchanges and to the acquisition of useful information. To characterise
cognitions that are typically false and irrational but may also carry beneﬁts of this sort, Bortolotti introduces the notion of
epistemic innocence which captures the status of cognitions that have some signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁt and whose beneﬁt
could not be attained by other means. To show that at least in some circumstances there may be no alternatives to a delu-
sional belief, Bortolotti argues that in anosognosia people do not have direct evidence of their impairments and are unable to
integrate indirect evidence about their impairments in their concept of themselves. This means that one plausible alterna-
tive to the delusional belief that they are not impaired, that is, the belief that they are impaired, may not be available to
them. Bortolotti concludes that, in the case of motivated delusions, psychological beneﬁts can turn into epistemic ones.
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rationality to the rationality debate in cognitive science. The rationality debate concerns the implications of people failing
simple inductive and deductive reasoning tasks in experimental settings. The friends of ecological rationality correctly point
out that failure in solving the reasoning tasks may be explained in some circumstances by the fact that the tasks are pre-
sented in a misleading way. But they also defend a more general and stronger claim, the claim that heuristics regarded
as epistemically ﬂawed or biased can be shown to be ecologically rational. This is the claim Boudry and colleagues ﬁnd prob-
lematic. Some of the heuristics responsible for reasoning mistakes can be adaptive, but they cannot be redeemed as rational.
Boudry and colleagues illustrate the difference between adaptiveness and rationality with the example of superstitious
beliefs and fast-and-frugal heuristics. Superstitious beliefs may be adaptive (as in some environments genetic ﬁtness may
be enhanced in organisms that avoid risks) but this does not make them rational (as they are badly supported by the evi-
dence and fail to track the truth). A fast-and-frugal heuristic such as the recognition heuristic is useful when people are
asked to make a choice in a situation of ignorance. They select better-known versus less well-known items, and this can lead
them to making the right choice in some environments. But in advertising the recognition heuristic is exploited: the pres-
ence of a known brand determines a consumer’s choice, and other relevant factors such as product quality are not taken into
account. Heuristics are effective in some domains, and misﬁre in others. Their local adaptiveness is deﬁnitely a beneﬁt, but it
is not a good indication of their epistemic rationality.
2. What are the beneﬁts of distorted memories?
Jordi Fernandez argues that memories have (at least) two types of functions and two types of beneﬁts. They preserve
information about the past (narrative function) and they are reconstructions of events that engage the same capacities
involved in imagination and are aimed to build a narrative (reconstructive function). They can provide good evidence about
the past, thereby allowing the subject to represent the past accurately (which is epistemically beneﬁcial); and they con-
tribute to the formation of beliefs about the past that have an instrumental value for the agent, thereby allowing the agent
to satisfy some of her goals (which is adaptively beneﬁcial). Depending on the agent’s goals, the epistemic beneﬁts and the
adaptiveness of memories can be related. In the paper, Fernandez asks whether two forms of memory distortions—observer
memories and fabricated memories—can be adaptive. In the context of trauma, observer memories enable agents to obtain
some affective relief in the short term, but may hinder their capacity to develop a coherent and healthy self-concept in the
long term. In the context of false memories of abuse, memories can respond to a need for explanation thereby relieving
internal tensions, but can cause emotional damage and compromise personal relationships. The interesting result is that,
if we take memory to have only a narrative function, then observer memories and fabricated memories are not distorted.
They have been produced to further the goals of the agent, not to represent the past correctly. But if we take memory to
have only a preservative function, then observer memories and fabricated memories have no beneﬁts, because the only
beneﬁts that count are epistemic ones. Fernandez argues that both conclusions are unattractive and that the case of ben-
eﬁcial memory distortions suggests that we should take an inclusive approach to the functions of memory.
Martin Conway and Catherine Loveday reach a similar conclusion to Fernandez, that false memories can have signiﬁ-
cant beneﬁts for an agent, but start from a more radical position in that they downplay the preservative function of memory,
based on empirical investigations of how memory works. Memories and imagined events are constructed in a similar way,
inferentially, via the so-called ‘‘remembering–imagining system’’, and the accuracy of autobiographical memories is under-
stood in terms of the relationship between correspondence (how the memory captures an experienced event) and coherence
(how the memory coheres with other beliefs about the self). Whereas a memory can succeed in its coherence, it can never
fully succeed in its correspondence as it will always be partial and to some extent distorted. No memories represent events
‘‘literally’’ and maybe they are not supposed to do so. The main function of memory is to ‘‘generate personal meanings’’, that
is, to provide an understanding of the world that allows agents to successfully adapt to it.
3. What is pathological in delusional beliefs?
Aikaterina Fotopoulou argues that, just as the past self is known via inference from autobiographical memory, so the
present self is known via perceptual inference. Due to its indirect nature, representations of the past and present self are
imperfect, both in the context of normal perceptual inference and of pathological conditions such as anosognosia for hemi-
plegia. Consistent with the prediction–error model, in Fotopoulou’s account the brain predicts the hidden causes of sensory
inputs and revises such predictions in order to minimise errors. There some delusional beliefs emerging in anosognosia, such
as the illusion of movement and the adherence to the denial of paralysis even after the paralysis has been acknowledged.
How can these beliefs be explained? A temptation is to rely on a multiplicity of distinct factors, where the hypothesis is that
both perception and reasoning are damaged. But Fotopoulou argues instead that we should just focus on perceptual inference.
In anosognosia prediction errors are absent or unreliable and this results in patients making inferences from out-of-date
models of their motor abilities. More speciﬁcally, in Fotopoulou’s account, anosognosia is due to an inability to update bodily
awareness in the light of new information about the affected body parts and to integrate ﬁrst- and third-person perspectives
on the body. Anosognosia for hemiplegia is just an exaggeration of the imperfection of bodily awareness.
Kengo Miyazono also considers the costs of delusional beliefs, and attempts to account for their pathological nature.
What is the difference between everyday irrational beliefs, such as the unjustiﬁed belief in the inﬁdelity of one’s spouse
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Miyazono critically assesses several answers provided in the literature and dismisses them: delusions are not necessarily
more bizarre, more irrational, or less understandable than non-delusional beliefs. Moreover, it is not always the case that
a person with delusions lacks responsibility for the actions guided by her delusional beliefs. Miyazono’s positive account
is that delusions are pathological because they involve a harmful biological malfunction. Delusions are harmful because they
disrupt good functioning and often negatively affect the quality of life of people who report them. Delusions are malfunc-
tioning beliefs because the processes by which they are formed are abnormal in some important respect (that is, in some
respect other than statistical normality), where the respects in which the process malfunctions vary according to one’s pre-
ferred aetiological account of delusions. In the person who forms delusions, either experience is abnormal or, additionally,
there are deﬁcits concerning attention and reasoning.
4. What are the costs and beneﬁts of implicit cognitions?
Jules Holroyd investigates responsibility for implicit biases and the actions resulting from them. Holroyd considers three
epistemic conditions for responsibility for implicit bias, endorsing the third, which is that one should have observational
awareness of the effects of implicitly biased behaviour. Observational awareness is being aware that one’s behaviour has
some morally undesirable property, for example, the property of being discriminatory. According to Holroyd, we should
not be asking whether agents do, as a matter of fact, have observational awareness of their biased behaviour, but rather,
whether they ought to have this awareness, and whether they are culpable for not having it. Drawing on empirical work,
Holroyd argues that agents can have observational awareness of their discriminatory behaviours that are based on implicit
attitudes. She also argues that agents ought to have this awareness, and resists the claim that agents are not responsible for
behaviours manifesting biases because biased actions are guided by implicit cognitions. Finally, Holroyd considers the role of
other imperfect cognitions in relation to implicit biases, speciﬁcally, failures of attentiveness, and self-deception. She sug-
gests that an investigation into whether agents are responsible for actions guided by implicit biases may in part depend
on the relationship between implicit biases and other imperfect cognitions.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett is interested in the epistemic status of confabulatory explanations of decisions or actions guided by
implicit bias. She is keen to resist the trade-off view of imperfect cognitions; that a cognition enjoys pragmatic beneﬁts at
the expense of epistemic ones. To this end, she too appeals to the notion of epistemic innocence. She focuses on two imagined
cases of decisions or actions guided by implicit biases. Via an analysis of these cases, she argues that at least sometimes,
confabulatory explanations of decisions or actions guided by implicit bias are epistemically innocent. First, they may be epis-
temically beneﬁcial. They ﬁll an explanatory gap, potentially leading to the acquisition and retention of true beliefs and
knowledge, and they also help to maintain consistency between an agent’s beliefs. Second, alternative (more epistemically
worthy) explanations that could confer these beneﬁts are unavailable. Sullivan-Bissett concludes that when we are in the
business of epistemic evaluation, we should consider both the epistemic beneﬁts of an imperfect cognition, and the context
in which it occurs.
5. Conclusions
We believe that the eight papers in this issue initiate a much needed interdisciplinary dialogue on imperfect cognitions,
and make substantial progress in answering key research questions about the types of costs and beneﬁts that such cogni-
tions in the clinical and non-clinical population may have.
Hopefully the ideas presented here will also stimulate further empirical research and conceptual investigation into dif-
ferent forms of imperfect cognitions, and help sketch a more psychologically realistic account of human agency and
cognition.
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